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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
.MICHAEL J. HILLYARD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
CITY COURT OF LOGAN CITY, 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 15964 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF UPON REHEARING 
* * * * 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a civil action brought by the Plaintiff 
seeking a Writ of Prohibition. The District Court of 
Cache County, State of Utah granted the Writ of Prohibition 
and the Supreme Court of the State of Utah on the 18th day 
of April, 1978, upheld the Judgment of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts found in the Appellant's Brief 
is !incorporated into this Brief on Rehearin·g with one 
addition. M.i:!a. Low's statement found in the transcript, 
page 3, line 21 where he indicated that the defendant 
was arrested near Hyde Park, Utah. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT 1 S DECISION IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE WILL 
HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT UPON THE NEWLY ENACTED CIRCUIT 
COURT ACT OF 1977. 
The legislature of the State of Utah in 1977 enacted 
legislation,' that constitutes a major revision of the court 
system in the State of Utah. Circuit Courts replacing the 
present City Courts will have expanded jurisdiction and 
the Justice~~ Courts will have essentially the same juris-
diction except that complaints alleging reckless driving 
and drunk driving must be commenced in the Circuit Court. 
The decision of this Court will have an impact upon the 
Circuit Court system because Section 41~6~166 U.C.A., as 
amended in 1975, was not repealed by the legislature and 
therefore, when a person is arrested for drunk driving 
they are required by Section 41-6-166 to be taken before 
the nearest most accessible magistrate for the purpose 
of setting bond (77-10-5 U.C.A., as newly enacted, defines 
magistrates to include Justices of the Peace and the Cir-
cuit Court Judges.) This Court 1 s decision will then confer 
upon the magistrate jurisdiction over a case contrary to 
the provisions of the Circuit Court Act~ Section 78-4-5 
u .C .A., as amended in 1977, which in part reads as follows: 
"All complaints for offenses charged under 
Title 41, except for offenses charged under Article 
5 of Chapter 6 of Title 41, must be filed in the 
Court of the Municipal Justice of the Peace or 
precinct of the county Justice of the Peace where 
the offense occurred where such justice courts 
exist and have jurisdiction of such offense." 
Page 2 
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Amended Section 78-5-4 of the Circuit Court Act, which 
oecomes effective on July 1, 1978, granns to the Circuit 
Court jurisdiction over all Class A and Class B mis-
demeanors committed in the respective counties in which 
such Courts are established. Drunk driving and reckless 
driving are Class B misdemeanors. 
Therefore, the new Circuit Courts will have juris-
diction over all misdemeanors and the Justices' Courts 
will have jurisdiction over all Class B and C misdemeanors. 
However, the Circuit Court Act provides that all traffic 
complaints except drunk driving and reckless driving 
must be filed in the Court of Municipal Justice of the 
Peace in the precinct where the offense occurred where 
such Courts exist and have jurisdiction. 
What the statute doesn't say is where to file the 
drunk driving and reckless driving complaints, however, 
it is inferred that it will be with the Circuit Courts. 
The foregoing section is not couched in terms of a 
legislative grant of jurisdiction but as a directive to 
the filing officer. 
The decision in this case will have the effect of 
forcing the filing of the Complaint in a Justice's Court 
contrary to the legislative intent and depriving the 
Defendants of the benefits of the Circuit Court Act. 
I respectively suggest to the Court that an interpre-
tation of Section 41-6-166 U.C.A., 1953, as amended in 1975, 
in this case to the effect that the appearance before the 
Page 3 
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magistrate is for the purpose of setting bond only will 
have the following benefits to the accused, the judiciary, 
and the members of the Bar: 
a. The arrested person will be advised of the charges 
against him and have the opportunity of having bond set in 
·order to aid in his defense and secure the services of an 
attorney. He will be tried by a law trained Judge in the 
Circuit Court. 
b. The Justices of the Peace will still fix the bond 
for the Circuit Court where the matter will be tried Md 
the legislative intention relating to the enactment of the 
Circuit Court system will be preserved. 
c. The members of the Bar will be able to advise 
their clients as to the nature of the proceedings brought 
against their client and the Court where the matter will 
be tried. The problems relating to venue will be elimi-
nated.in:Ji'he,.::.prosecuting attorneys at the inception of 
the:circuit Court Act will know proper procedures for 
l 
filing of Complaints. Further judicial interpretation of 
the Circuit Court Act will be eliminated. 
In 1975 the first special session of the legislatun 
added words "for the purpose of setting bond" to Section 
41-6-166 U.C.A. This legislation followed the decision 
by this Court in the case of Wells vs. City Court of Lo~ 
City, County of Cache, State of Utah, 535 P.2d 683. The 
addition of the words by the legislature was to clarify 
Page 4 
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the purpose of the statute after the Wells decision. The 
Circuit Court Act also reflects the legislature's intent 
as shown by the amendment. 
It is conceded that the provisions of 41-6-166 differ 
from other provisions found in the criminal code such as 
Section 77-13-17 U.C.A. which is covered in the following 
points of this Brief. 
POINT II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS OPIN·ION AS TO THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTION 41-6-166 and 77-13-17 U.C.A. 
This Court in its decision cited Section 77-13-17 
U.C.A., as amended in 1971, in holding that the appearance 
before a magistrate to set bond confers jurisdiction for 
the trial of the matter. Title 77 of the U.C.A. relates 
to the general code of criminal procedure and is govern-
ing with respect to the general law of criminal procedure. 
Section 41-6-166 relates to specific traffic offenses 
and is therefore specific in ins application •. The 
Section states: "Wheneverrany person is arrested for 
any violation of this act •••••• " The language gives the 
statute a special relationship with the Motor Vehicle 
Code and not to the general criminal code. See Bateman 
vs. Board of Examiners, Ut., 322 P.2d 381, in which this 
Court announced the rule that the more specific statute 
takes precedence over a general statute. The case of 
Pacific Intermountain Express Co. vs. State Tax Commission, 
Page 5 
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316 P.2d 549, in which this Court stated as follows: 
. ".In case of conflict, a later enactment is 
controlling over an earlier one; and that express 
provisions of statutes take preference over gen-
eral ones." 
New Mexico has decided a case closely in point. see 
State vs. Sawyers, 445 P.2d ,978,· where the defendant was 
convicted of an offense under the Motor Vehicle Code oA J lO 
',i, 
that State and sentenced under the provisions of the Motor 
Vehicle Code. The defendant objected stating that the 
·! provisions of the general criminal law with regards to 
sentencing applied to him. The New Mexico Supreme Court 
said as follows: 
"If the general statute, standing alone, 
would include the same matter as the special 
statute and thus conflict with the special 
statute, the special statute controls since 
it is considered an exception to the general 
statute." I 
that I 
the special statute (Section 41-6-166 U.C.A.) would control 
That rule as it applies to this case would be 
the type of appearance before the magistrate (to fix bond 
only) and the general statute (Section 77-13-17 u.c.A.) 
Would not apply to this type of traffic situation. The 
requirements of Section 77-13-17 u .c .A. that the Complaint 
be filed in the same Court as the appearance to fix bond 
would be a general statute and subject to the exception 
of a special statute. 
In the case of People vs. Talbot, California, 414 
P.2d 633, the California Supreme Court held that it is 
a generally accepted rule that in adopting legislation 
Page 6 
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the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of existing 
domestic judicial decisions and to have enacted and amended ~ 
statutes in the light of such decisions. This case is 
pertinent as there is a direct relationship between the 
Wells decision decided in 1975, and the amendment of 
Section-41-6-166 U.C.A. in 1975. Section 41-6-166 U.C.A. 
was amended after the Wells decision and as a result of 
that decision and therefore the legislature intended 
that the appearance before the magistrate be for the sole 
purpose of setting bond. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT'S DECISION IN THIS CASE FAILS TO CONSIDER 
THE IMPACT OF THE DECISION ON THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE 
TRIED BEFORE A LAN TRAINED JUDGE. 
It can be stated without citation that a defendant 
accused of a crime where there is potential imprisonment 
involved in the sentencing for the crime has the option 
of ha'iting'c_hisacase tried before a law trained Judge. It 
is conceded that this is an option that rests only with 
the defendant and nottthe State of Utah. This rule of 
law was recently codified by the legislature in the enact-
ment of Section 78-5-4 U.C.A. of the new Circuit Court 
Act where it states as follows: 
"Notwithstanding any provisions of this 
code relating to jurisdiction and venue of 
justice courts, in any matter in which the 
judge has the option of imposing a jail sen-
tence the defendant may demand and shall be 
accorded the right to have the case tried 
before a judge who is a member of the Utah 
State Bar." 
Page 7 
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The allegation charging a person with the offense 
of drunk driving is an offense that carries with it an 
option held by the Court of imposing a jail sentence. 
The present decision of this Court in this case would 
impose upon the State a burden of filing the case before 
the magistrate where the initial appearance was had for 
t 
the purpose of setting bond. The magistrate would in 
all probability, not be a law trained Judge. Therefore, 
the decision would encourage the filing of the complaint 
contrary to the Circuit Court Act and the trial of this 
type of case before a person who did not have legal 
training which is contrary to the desired effect of 
the United State Supreme Court decision and the Circuit 
Court Act. The result would be the expense and time 
consuming act of the defendant making his demand (if he 
so elected) and the Court's time and effort going 
toward a non-productive aspect of the justice system. 
Here also would be an additional time spent by the 
defendant's attorney and resulting in increased costs to 
the defendant. I recognize that this argument is related 
to public policy and convenience and not to the legal 
issues but is brought out to the Court's attention at 
a time when various members of our government are critical 
of the fees that are being charged by our bar members. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT IN ITS DECISION FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSID-
ERATION THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 41-6-167.U.C.A. 
Page 8 
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~llied with Section 41-6-166 U.C.A., which provides 
for the appearance in traffic cases before a magistrate 
for the purpose of setting bond, is Section 41-6-167 U.C.A 
which governs the procedure at the time the person is 
taken before the magistrate. Here again is the special 
statute for the purpose of dealing with certain traffic 
matters and supersedes the provisions of Section 77-13-77 
U.C.A. which is a general statute. Section 41-6-167 does 
not state that the action must be filed before the same 
magistrate as the appearance is before, but states that 
the defendant must be informed as to the place and time 
to appear, thus indicating that the Complaint may be 
filed before any other magistrate having jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
As I approach the Court with this Brief, I do so 
v1i th some trepidation. I realize that in filing this 
Brief I am asking gentlemen of far greater experience 
than I to reconsider their former opinion. I am asking 
learned men to change their minds in a case well considered 
and well reasoned by them. I further realize that the 
adventof the Circuit Court Act is yet in the future and 
cannot affect the ultimate rights of this defendant. The 
real issue is the administration of our laws so that the 
defendant and the State can make the administration 
of justice expedient yet fair to all. This Brief is 
filed as a request to the Court for guidelines in which 
all parties may achieve the ends of justice. As a 
Page 9 
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prosecutor, I would like to advise those officers within 
our jurisdiction of the proper procedures for fair treat-
ment of those arrested. I hope to avoid the costly appeal 
process to those persons who become involved with this type 
of action under the Circuit Court System. As a prosecutor, 
I can and will live with the Hillyard decision as it now 
stands. I can advise the officers in our county of this 
decision and its implications. That is not the point. 
The point is that I believe there is a good legal 
basis for interpreting the law of this case as set 
forth in this Brief and that such interpretation would 
be for the benefit of the defendant, his counsel, the 
Courts of this jurisdiction and the counsel.for the 
State of Utah. I do not purport to claim that.the 
majority of this Court has made an .error in their decision, 
but only to point out a different approach to the problem 
of equal merit and seek your additional counsel upon the 
implementation of the Circuit Court Act. 
RESPECTFULLY SUMMITTED this :J2.-- day of May, 1978. 
RRIS 
By 
Deputy ache County 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Page 10 
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~ffiiLING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief to Mr. Arthur Christean at 
the Court Administrator's Office, 250 E. Broadway, 
SLC, UT 84101 and to l!r. David S. Younq/at 220 So. 
/ ' 
200 E. #450, SLC, UT 84111, this day of 
1978. 
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